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This paper explores the effect of mortalities from the 1918 influenza pandemic and 
World War I on wage growth in the manufacturing sectors of U.S. states and cities from 
1914 to 1919.  The hypothesis is that both events caused a decrease in manufacturing 
labor supply, thereby initially increasing the marginal product of labor and wages.  The 
results reveal that states and cities having had greater influenza mortalities experienced 
greater wage growth – roughly 2 to 3 percentage points for a 10 percent change in per 
capita mortalities.  World War I combat mortalities also had a positive, but smaller, effect 
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“…there is not a single expert machinist in the labor market today.  If such a one exists he 




I.  Introduction 
  The possibility of a world-wide influenza pandemic (i.e. the “Avian Flu”) in the 
near future is of growing concern for many countries around the globe.  The World Bank 
estimates that a global influenza pandemic would cost the world economy $800 billion 
and kill tens-of-millions of people.
2  Researchers at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention calculate that deaths in the United States could reach 207,000 and the 
initial cost to the economy could approach $166 billion, or roughly 1.5 percent of GDP.
3  
Long run costs are expected to be much greater.  The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services paints a more dire picture – up to 1.9 million dead in the United States 
and initial economic costs near $200 billion.
4
  While researchers and public officials can only speculate on the likelihood of a 
global influenza pandemic, many of the worst case scenario predictions from a current 
pandemic are based on the global influenza pandemic of 1918-1919.  This global 
pandemic (often termed the “Spanish Flu”) killed 675,000 people in the United States 
(nearly 1 percent of the 1910 population) and nearly 40 million people world-wide.
5  
Only the Black Death of 1348-1351 is estimated to have killed more people (roughly 60 
                                                 
1 “Solving Problem of Labor with Dilution,” The Arkansas Gazette, Little Rock, Arkansas, October 22, 
1918, page 6.  
2 Brahmbhatt (2005). 
3 Meltzer et al. (1999). 
4 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2005). 
5 See Potter (2001).  The 1918 influenza pandemic was termed the “Spanish Flu” by the Allies of World 
War I since Spain had one of the worst early outbreaks of the disease, with nearly 8 million people infected 
by early 1918. 
  2million) over a similar time period.
6  The global magnitude and spread of the 1918 
influenza pandemic was exacerbated by World War I, which itself is estimated to have 
killed roughly 10 million civilians and 9 million troops.
7  Not only did the mass 
movement of troops from around the world lead to the spread of the disease, tens of 
thousands of Allied and Central Power troops died as a result of the influenza pandemic 
rather than combat.
8  Although combat deaths in World War I did increase the mortality 
rates for participating countries, civilian mortality rates from the 1918 influenza 
pandemic were typically much higher.  For the United States, estimates of combat related 
troop mortalities are about one-tenth that of civilian mortalities from the 1918 influenza 
pandemic.  
  Given the magnitudes and the concurrence of both the 1918 influenza pandemic 
and World War I, one would expect volumes of research on the economic effects of each 
event.  Although there does exist a significant literature on the economic consequences of 
World War I (Rockoff, 2004), the scope of published research on the economic effects of 
the 1918 influenza pandemic is scant.
9  Most research that has been done has focused on 
the health and economic outcomes of decedents of pandemic survivors (Keyfits and 
Flieger, 1968; Almond, 2006) and mortality differences across socioeconomic classes 
(Noymer and Garenne, 2000; Mamelund, 2006). 
 This  paper  contributes  to the literature on the economic effects of the 1918 
influenza pandemic and World War I by exploring the influence of mortalities from these 
concurrent events on the growth of manufacturing wages in U.S. states and cities over the 
                                                 
6 Bloom and Mahal (1997).   
7 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I_casualties for a list of sources for the casualty statistics. 
8 See Ayres (1919).   
9 In their unpublished manuscript, Brainerd and Siegler (2003) conduct an analysis of the economic effects 
of the 1918 influenza in the decade following the pandemic.   
  3period 1914-1919.
10  The general conceptual foundation for the paper is that, ceteris 
paribus, both of these events resulted in a large number of deaths which constituted a 
significant negative shock to manufacturing labor supply and thereby would have 
increased wages in the manufacturing sector immediately following both events.  A 
similar conceptual framework has been used in studies that explored the economic effects 
of the Black Death (Campbell, 1997; Karakacili, 2004) and the effects of immigration on 
labor markets (Greenwood and McDowell, 1986; Borjas, 1987; Card, 1990). 
The analysis presented here is the first to separate the potential manufacturing 
labor market effects of World War I and the 1918 influenza pandemic.  This is an 
interesting exercise given that mortalities from the influenza pandemic were nearly ten 
times greater than World War I combat mortalities, but World War I combat mortalities 
were more likely men aged roughly 18 to 44, prime ages for manufacturing workers.  The 
results reveal that state having had higher influenza and combat mortalities experienced 
greater growth in manufacturing wages over the period 1914 to 1919, and the greater 
number of influenza mortalities had a greater overall effect on manufacturing wage 
growth from 1914 to 1919 than did combat mortalities. 
  The paper is organized as follows:  The next section presents state-level data on 
mortalities from the influenza pandemic and World War I and discusses differences in 
mortality rates across subpopulations.  The third section of the paper discusses in more 
                                                 
10 The manufacturing sector was chosen over other major employment sectors, such as agriculture, for 
several reasons.  First, the Census of Agriculture prior to 1977 was conducted on a decennial basis (with 
the U.S. Census), thus only providing data for 1910 and 1920.  It was thought that 1910 was too prior to the 
concurrence of the influenza pandemic and World War I to get reliable estimates of the influence of each 
event on agricultural wage growth.  The coverage dates of the Census of Manufacturers (1914 and 1919) 
are more proximal to both events.  Second, the U.S. Census of Agriculture only reported wage data for 
farm labor, which is only one of many classifications of agricultural employment.  Third, many of the labor 
market control variables which are discussed later, such as value added and capital, are not available or, 
because of the limitations on the agriculture employment data, would provide misleading values for capital 
per worker and value added per worker.   
  4detail the conceptual framework for the main hypothesis.  The data and empirical 
methodology are discussed in the fourth section.  The fifth section presents the empirical 
results from both state-level and city-level analyses and highlights the economic 
significance of the regression estimates.  The final section of the paper concludes. 
 
II.   World War I and the Influenza Pandemic across the States 
  The influenza pandemic of 1918 began in early 1918 and lasted throughout the 
spring of 1919.
11  Unlike a typical influenza that predominately kills the youngest and 
oldest members of a population, Brainerd and Siegler (2003) report that the 1918 
pandemic disproportionately killed people aged 15 to 44, with over one percent of the 
male population in the United States aged 25-34 dying from the disease.  Data from the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Mortality Statistics 1920 reveal that general population 
mortality rates in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Colorado were the highest in the nation, 
with over one percent of the states’ populations killed by the pandemic.  Although male 
and female mortality rates are typically similar, Brainerd and Siegler (2003) report that 
the male mortality rate from the influenza pandemic was at least 50 percent higher than 
the female mortality rate.   
  Evidence also suggests that influenza mortality rates had no relationship with 
state economic conditions, climate, or geography (Crosby, 1989; Brainerd and Siegler, 
2003).  After providing a survey of anecdotal evidence and conducting statistical 
analyses, Brainerd and Siegler (2003, page 7) conclude that “The statistical evidence also 
supports the notion of influenza mortality as an exogenous shock to the population.”   
Table 1 lists the states having the 5 highest and 5 lowest influenza mortality rates in 
                                                 
11 See Crosby (1989) for a detailed discussion of the 1918-1919 influenza pandemic in the United States. 
  51916-1917 (non-pandemic years) and 1918, along with the average mortality rate for all 
other states.   
[Table 1 about here] 
  American troops were deployed to Europe starting in the early summer of 1918 
and remained there until the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918.  The United 
States deployed over 4 million troops, and approximately 3 percent were killed in action 
(combat or otherwise).  Table 1 lists the states having the 5 highest and 5 lowest combat 
mortality rates, as well as the average combat mortality rate for all other states.  World 
War I combat mortality rates shown in Table 1 do not include death from diseases, such 
as the influenza pandemic.  World War I combat mortality rates ranged from a low of 
about 19 per 100,000 population in Florida to over 161 per 100,000 population in 
Montana, with an average of about 52 per 100,000 population for all states.   
 
III.   The Conceptual Framework behind the Hypothesis 
  The testable hypothesis of this paper is that influenza and World War I mortalities 
had a direct impact on wage rates in the manufacturing sector immediately following 
both events.  A neoclassical analysis of the market for manufacturing labor serves as the 
conceptual basis for this hypothesis.  A decrease in the supply of manufacturing workers 
resulting from influenza and World War I mortalities would have had the initial effect of 
reducing manufacturing labor supply, increasing the marginal product of labor, and 
increasing real wages.  Capital per worker would also have initially increased.  In terms 
of the Solow (1956) growth model and the growth model of Romer (1986), this initial 
increase in capital per worker would have resulted in an increase in output per worker 
  6and an increase in wages.
12  In the short term, labor immobility across cities or states is 
likely to have prevented wage equalization, and a substitution away from relatively more 
expensive labor to capital is unlikely to have occurred.
13
  The mortality rates and subpopulations most effected by each event are suggestive 
of the likely effect on wages.  Mortalities from both events were disproportionately males 
aged 18 to 44.  It is this subpopulation which constituted the common demographic of a 
manufacturing sector employee.  For example, using 1910 data on the male population 
between the ages of 18 and 44, the average combat mortality rate from World War I was 
about 202 per 100,000 men aged 18 to 44, or about 4 times the total population mortality 
rate.  The 1918 influenza pandemic also disproportionately killed men aged 25-34 
compared to typical cases of influenza.  Since state level mortality rates from the 
influenza pandemic were greater than the mortality rates from World War I, it seems 
reasonable that influenza mortality rates would have had a greater overall effect on 
manufacturing wage growth than World War I combat mortalities.   
 
IV. Data and Empirical Methodology 
To accurately assess the influence of influenza and World War I mortalities on the 
growth of manufacturing wages, it will be important when building the empirical model 
                                                 
12 This framework assumes some degree of labor market flexibility during the late 1910s.  There is no 
evidence that real or nominal wages were completely rigid during this period, although there is debate in 
the literature over wage flexibility (in response to the business cycle) at the beginning of the 20
th century 
compared to the end of 20
th century.  See Gordon (1983), Schultze (1986), Allen (1992), Sundstrom (1992).   
13  The empirical models discussed later will capture the effect of labor mobility.  The long run effect of 
influenza and war mortalities on manufacturing wage growth is less clear.  Although the Solow (1956) 
growth model suggests that capital per worker will eventually fall (due to diminishing returns to capital) 
and therefore decrease wages, Romer’s (1986) growth model predicts capital per worker will continue to 
rise over time as a result of non-diminishing returns to capital, thereby increasing wages.  It is also possible 
that the war and the pandemic decreased consumer confidence, investment and savings, and long term 
income growth of households due to the death of households’ primary breadwinners.  These factors would 
result in lower aggregate output and production, thereby decreasing the demand for labor and placing 
downward pressure on manufacturing wages.  
  7to consider others factors that are likely to have influenced the manufacturing labor 
market, and thus wage changes, over the period 1914-1919.  For example, wartime 
production is likely to have increased wage rates as a result of an increase in labor 
demand.  Also, general growth in manufacturing, and thus changes in labor supply and 
labor demand, from 1914 prior to World War I and the influenza pandemic should be 
considered.  Finally, the capital stock available to manufacturing workers and the 
productivity of manufacturing labor are likely to have had effects on manufacturing wage 
growth.  Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis, which are discussed in 
detail below, are shown in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Data 
  The dependent variable in the empirical model is the percentage change in real 
manufacturing wages per worker from 1914 to 1919.  Data on the number of 
manufacturing wage earners and the total manufacturing wage bill for 1914 and 1919 
were obtained from the 1919 U.S. Census of Manufactures.  The 1919 estimates for the 




Influenza Mortalities 1918-1919 
  State-level mortality rates from the 1918 influenza pandemic were obtained from 
the U.S Bureau of the Census, Mortality Statistics 1920 (page 30).  The mortality rates 
                                                 
14 The only effect of using real 1919 wages rather than nominal 1919 wages is that, with real 1919 wages, 
each coefficient estimate will differ from its value if nominal wages were used by a factor of θ, where θ is 
equal to the ratio of the 1914 and 1919 national CPI. 
  8used in this study (and Brainerd and Siegler, 2003) represent deaths from both influenza 
and pneumonia because “it is not believed to be best to study separately influenza and the 
various forms of pneumonia….for doubtless many cases were returned as influenza when 
the deaths were caused by pneumonia and vice versa.”
15   
Although the Census compilation is the most cited source for reliable influenza 
pandemic mortality estimates, the data do have several limitations, many of which can be 
remedied.  First, only thirty states reported influenza and pneumonia deaths for 1918 and 
1919.
16  Second, influenza and pneumonia were common diseases prior the 1918 
pandemic, so an arguably better measure of how the pandemic affected mortality rates 
would be to compare mortality rates in non-pandemic years with the mortality rates in 
1918 and 1919.  One could then calculate how many more deaths than usual were from 
influenza and pneumonia in 1918 and 1919 and use this as an explanatory variable.  
Unfortunately, although Mortality Statistics contains annual data for a ten year period, 
these data are incomplete for many states for many years.  For the thirty states that do 
report influenza and pneumonia deaths for 1918 and 1919, a portion of these states do not 
report mortality rates for other years, thus making a comparison between pandemic and 
non-pandemic years impossible.  As a result, the state-level influenza and pneumonia 
mortality rate variable will be capturing “natural” influenza and pneumonia mortalities 
that occurred in 1918 and 1919 as well as the much higher number of deaths caused by 
the pandemic.
17  Table 1 allows a rough comparison of the “natural” influenza and 
                                                 
15 U.S Bureau of the Census, Mortality Statistics 1919, page 28. 
16 The states excluded from the analysis are: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, District of Columbia, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Mississippi, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming. 
17 As is discussed later, city level mortality data is based on excess influenza mortalities as a result of the 
pandemic. 
  9pneumonia mortality rate (1916-1917) and the rates from the 1918 pandemic.  Mortality 
rates from the 1918 pandemic were roughly 2.5 times higher than in the non-pandemic 
years of 1916 and 1917. 
A third issue is that the mortality death rates are based on annual state-level 
population values that were computed using linear interpolation between the 1910 and 
1920 decennial census values.
18  By construct, this methodology imposes a constant 
growth rate in each state’s population between 1910 and 1920.  To correct for this fact, 
the mortality rates were re-computed using state 1914 population estimates based on U.S 
Census (1956) revisions of earlier estimates of state population.
19,20   
One final issue is the matching of influenza mortality to manufacturing 
employment.  The majority of influenza mortalities were young to middle-aged men, 
which was a prime age for a manufacturing worker.  However, men outside of this age 
range and some women were also employed in manufacturing.  Thus, two different sets 
of mortality rates are employed for the state-level analysis to best link between influenza 
mortalities and manufacturing employment.  The two mortality rates are: (1) total 
population mortality rates (men and women of all ages), and (2) mortality rates for men 
and women aged 20 to 49. 
 
                                                 
18 See Mortality Statistics 1920, page 9. 
19 The mortality rates were re-computed as follows: First, the linearly interpolated population estimates 
were computed using the 1910 and 1920 decennial population estimates.  The mortality rates for each of 
the 30 states in the sample were then each multiplied by the respective interpolated population value to get 
the number of deaths from influenza and pneumonia.  The number of deaths was then divided by the 
revised U.S. Census (1956) estimates of 1914 population.  The U.S. Census (1956) used statistical 
sampling rather than linear interpolation to re-estimate state population estimates for earlier years. 
20 State population in 1914 is used to normalize influenza and World War I mortalities because many of the 
labor market variables discussed later are normalized by the number of manufacturing workers in 1914.  
Normalizing influenza and World War I mortalities by state population in other years did not significantly 
change the empirical results.  Differences in the mortality rates published in Mortality Statistics and the re-
estimated mortality rates using the revised population estimates for 1914 were less than 1 percent. 
  10World War I Mortalities 
  World War I servicemen mortality data are from the Adjutant General of the 
Army 1919 (1920).  These data are quite detailed, listing the number of servicemen that 
died from various causes, such as accident, drowning, suicide, or homicide.  Because the 
1918 influenza pandemic affected troops during the war, the World War I combat 
mortality figures used in the empirical analysis are total serviceman mortalities minus the 
number of serviceman mortalities from disease.  This is done to avoid double counting 
because soldiers who died from influenza are included in the pandemic mortality figures 
discussed earlier.
21  Like influenza mortalities, the number of serviceman combat 
mortalities from each state is normalized by 1914 state population. 
One issue is the labor supply effect from the deployment of servicemen 
throughout 1918 to fight in World War I.
22  The absence of these troops from the 
manufacturing labor market would have immediately reduced the supply of labor and 
increased wages in that sector.
23  However, U.S. troops returned home after the signing 
of the Armistice in November 1918.  Under the assumption that most of the servicemen 
who returned home from the war in late 1918 were re-employed (especially in a booming 
economy), then the labor supply shock lasting throughout 1919 would have been from 
combat mortalities.  The fact that the 1919 U.S. Census of Manufacturers was taken in 
1920 and covered the 1919 calendar year suggests a reasonable time period for the re-
                                                 
21 Mortality Statistics 1920 (page 9).  The combat mortality values also include deaths from accidents, etc. 
22 Contacts at the various branches of the armed services and the National Archives report that no 
comprehensive, official list of World War I servicemen by state exists.  The population survey for the 1930 
U.S. Census did ask the question of veteran status, but contacts at the Census Bureau report that this 
information has not been compiled by state and would likely be a misleading indicator of the number of 
servicemen during World War I due to mobility across states and the deaths of servicemen that occurred 
after the war but prior to the 1930 Census. 
23 The labor supply effect would have been less if servicemen were enlisted before the war began. 
  11employment of returning troops and a reduction in labor supply resulting solely from 
combat mortalities.   
 
Labor Market Control Variables 
  Because labor productivity influences wage rates, it is important to control for this 
influence in the empirical models.  Capital per worker and value added per worker are 
included in the models to capture potential productivity differences across states.  To 
avoid possible endogeneity problems, the 1914 value of both variables are included in the 
model rather than the percentage change in each variable from 1914 to 1919.  Capital per 
worker in 1914 is computed using 1914 data on capital and the number of wage earners 
from the Census of Manufactures 1919.  Similarly, value added in manufacturing in 1914 
is divided by the number of wage earners in 1914 to get valued added per worker. 
  The effect of these two variables on the percentage change in wages is unclear.  
Theory suggests that states having had greater value added in manufacturing and greater 
manufacturing capital per worker were likely to have a higher level of wages.  In fact, 
there is a high positive correlation between 1914 annual wages per manufacturing worker 
and 1914 value added per worker (ρ=0.81) and 1914 capital per worker (ρ=0.69).  In 
terms of each variable’s effect on the percentage change in wages, however, a story of 
convergence from Solow’s (1956) growth model would suggest that a state having a 
lower initial level of productivity in 1914 would have had a greater percentage increase in 
productivity through 1919, and thus a higher rate of wage growth.  Convergence would 
thus suggest a negative relationship between the two productivity variables and the 
percentage change in real wages per worker – higher levels of initial productivity (i.e., 
  12value added per worker and capital per worker) resulted in lower rates of wage growth.  
As support for the possibility of convergence in manufacturing wages, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) provide evidence on the convergence of state personal income over 
decennial periods beginning in 1920 and twenty year intervals prior to 1920. 
  The United States did not officially enter World War I until President Wilson 
asked for and received a declaration of war on Germany by the U.S Congress in April 
1917.  Prior to this time, however, the United States did supply its European allies 
fighting the war with aircraft and weaponry.  Shipbuilding and aircraft production 
encompassed the largest component of wartime production (Venzon, 1999).  The New 
York Shipbuilding Company located in Camden, New Jersey was the predominant 
producer of World War I naval battleships and aircraft carriers, and employed 30,000 
workers.
24  The largest contractors for military aircraft were located in Ohio, New York, 
and Michigan and employed nearly 200,000 workers.
25  It is reasonable to suspect that 
wartime production resulted in an increase in labor demand and thus wages in these 
states.  To control for wartime production in the empirical models, a dummy variable is 
included that has the value of ‘1’ if the state was involved in wartime production and a 
value of ‘0’ otherwise.  It is expected that the coefficient on wartime production is 
positive, reflecting the increase in labor demand and thus wage growth in war production 
states.
26
                                                 
24 See http://members.aol.com/nyship/history.html. 
25 See http://centennialofflight.gov/essay/Aerospace/WWi/Aero5.htm. 
26 Certainly numerous states in addition to those listed here were involved in some form of wartime 
production.  One cannot build ships and aircraft without steel and one cannot make steel without iron ore 
and coal, etc.   The coefficient on the wartime dummy variable can thus be interpreted as wartime 
production of final goods. 
  13  The general growth of the manufacturing sector between 1914 and 1919 is 
another potential influence on manufacturing wage growth.  A variable designed to 
capture the growth in a state’s manufacturing sector is included in the models.  
Specifically, the variable is the percentage change in a state’s manufacturing wage earner 
workforce between 1914 and 1919.  This variable reflects the growth in a state’s 
manufacturing sector from increases in labor demand and/or labor supply caused by 
factors such as population growth, immigration, labor force demographic change, 
technological change, etc.
27  If the percentage increase in the number of workers was 
predominately a result of increases in labor demand (supply), it is then expected that 
wage growth would have been higher (lower) in those states having had a manufacturing 




  To assess the influence of mortalities from the 1918 influenza pandemic and 
World War I on initial wage growth in the manufacturing sector, the percentage change 
in real manufacturing wages per worker from 1914-1919 is regressed on 1918-1919 
influenza mortalities per capita, World War I mortalities per capita, value added per 
worker in 1914, capital per worker in 1914, the wartime production dummy variable, and 
the growth in manufacturing sector variable.  In addition to the variables listed above, a 
                                                 
27 For all states in the sample, the number of manufacturing workers increased from 1914 to 1919.   
28 Hausman tests reveal that the percentage change in manufacturing workers is exogenous to the 
percentage change in manufacturing wages.  State population in 1914 and the percentage of children aged 5 
to 18 that were enrolled in school in 1912 were used as instruments along with all exogenous variables 
listed in Table 2.  The average p-value on the Hausman test statistics (t-statistic) was 0.71.  The results will 
gladly be provided on request.  The finding that the percentage change in manufacturing workers is 
exogenous is not too surprising given the time span used in this study, i.e., it is unlikely that a five-year 
period is long enough to capture the possible effect of higher wages inducing a substitution away from 
other sectors of the economy to the manufacturing sector. 
  14set of three regional dummy variables based on U.S. Census regions are also included to 
capture unobserved differences in manufacturing wage growth, such as union activity.
29  
Several regressions are run including or excluding variables as evidence for robustness 
across specifications.
30   
 
V.  Empirical Results 
  The state-level results from eight different regression specifications are shown in 
Table 3.  Influenza pandemic mortalities and World War I combat mortalities are 
included individually and together.  The aggregate effect of mortalities from both events 
is also considered in specifications (7) and (8).  Because of a relatively high level of 
correlation between value added per worker and capital per worker (ρ=0.76), regressions 
were estimated with and without both variables included as independent variables.  To 
complement the empirical results in Table 3, evidence on the economic significance of 
each variable is shown in Table 4.  The impact on wage growth from a 10 percent 
increase from the mean of each continuous independent variable is presented.  The effect 
of each binary variable on manufacturing wage growth is also presented in Table 4.   
[Table 3 about here] 
[Table 4 about here] 
The estimates shown in Table 3 reveal that most of the labor market control 
variables are statistically significant.  The states involved in wartime production 
                                                 
29 The dummy variable for the western region is omitted to avoid collinearity problems.  The regional 
dummy variables may also capture the effects of African American emigration from the South as well as 
European emigration (Minns, 2000; Maloney, 2002). 
30 State population density was considered in all empirical models in order to test whether higher density 
states experienced greater growth in the manufacturing sector.  Also, a measure of educational attainment 
(the percent of children aged 5 to 18 enrolled in public school in 1912) was considered.  The coefficients 
were not statistically significant and the variables were thus omitted from the final regressions. 
  15experienced a greater growth in manufacturing wages compared to non-production states 
(about 10 percentage points, on average, across specifications).  Also, states with 
manufacturing sectors that grew at a faster rate over 1914-1919 experienced greater 
manufacturing wage growth.  Specifically, the data in Table 4 reveal that growth in the 
manufacturing sector increased real manufacturing wage growth by 0.70 percentage 
points, on average.  This suggests that overall increases in manufacturing labor demand 
were greater than overall increases in manufacturing labor supply.  States with higher 
value added per worker in 1914 experienced a slower rate of real wage growth from 1914 
to 1919 – a ten percent increase from the mean value is shown to have decreased 
manufacturing wage growth by 2.90 percentage points, on average.  This finding supports 
the concept of convergence derived from the Solow (1956) growth model.  Finally, the 
coefficients on the regional dummy variables reveal that the average growth in 
manufacturing wages was higher, on average, in southern and mid-western states (about 
20 percentage points and 9 percentage points, respectively, on average) compared to 
states located in the west and northeast.   
Turning to the variables of interest – influenza pandemic and World War I 
mortalities - the coefficient estimates on influenza and World War I combat mortalities 
reported in Table 3 are positive and significant, thus supporting the hypothesis that the 
reduction in manufacturing labor supply resulted in an initial increase in real wage 
growth in the manufacturing sector.
31  The coefficients on aggregated mortalities 
(specifications (7) and (8)) are also positive and statistically significant.  The coefficient 
                                                 
31  The marginal impact of an influenza death and a combat death on 1914-1919 wage growth was 
(statistically) the same.  An F-test on the on the equality of the influenza mortality and the World War I 
combat mortality coefficients in specification (6) of Table 3 reveals that the null hypothesis of coefficient 
equality cannot be rejected at conventional levels (F=2.18).   
  16estimates on influenza and World War I mortalities are also relatively stable across 
specifications. 
   The economic significance of the effect of influenza and World War I combat 
mortalities on manufacturing wage growth are shown in Table 4.  Averaging across the 
predicted changes shown in Table 4, mortalities from the influenza pandemic and World 
War I resulted in a 1.93 and a 0.91 percentage point increase in real manufacturing wage 
growth, respectively.
32  The aggregate effect of influenza pandemic and World War I 
mortalities, shown in the fourth data column of Table 4, reveals a 2.49 percentage point 
increase in real manufacturing wage growth.   
  
Influenza Mortalities Aged 20 to 49 
Instead of considering the effect of all influenza deaths on manufacturing wage 
growth, empirical models are now estimated that consider influenza deaths of those aged 
20 to 49.  As reported earlier, influenza mortalities were disproportionately males aged 
18 to 44.
33  The regression results are shown in Table 5.   The first specification reveals 
that influenza deaths of those aged 20 to 49 had a positive and significant effect on 
manufacturing wage growth.  The coefficient on influenza deaths is not significant in the 
second specification that also considers World War I mortalities, however.  This is a 
likely result of the relatively high correlation between World War I mortalities and age 20 
                                                 
32 Recall that the influenza mortality rate variable also contains a ‘natural’ rate of influenza mortality that 
would have occurred in the absence of a pandemic.  On average, mortality rates from the influenza 
pandemic were about 2.5 times higher than the mortality rate in earlier non-pandemic years.  If we assume 
that the pandemic’s effect on wage growth is 2.5 times higher than the usual mortality rate, then this 
suggests that the net effect of the pandemic on wage growth was 1.16 percentage points (1.93-1.93/2.5). 
33  This variable was computed by summing influenza deaths in each state for those aged 20 to 29, 30 to 39, 
and 40 to 49.  In the sample of states used here, influenza mortalities of those aged 20 to 49 averaged 46.1 
percent of all influenza mortalities.  This variable has a standard deviation of 6.4 percent, a minimum value 
of 35 percent, and a maximum value of 63 percent.  The variable was normalized by 1914 state population. 
  17to 49 influenza mortalities (ρ=0.60), which is supported by the large difference between 
the influenza mortality coefficients reported in specification (1) and (2).  The total effect 
of World War I mortalities and age 20 to 49 influenza mortalities is positive and 
significant as seen in the third specification in Table 5, again suggesting that states 
having had more World War I and influenza mortalities experienced greater 
manufacturing wage growth. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The economic significance of World War I mortalities and age 20 to 49 influenza 
mortalities is demonstrated in Table 6 that considers the impact on wage growth from a 
10 percent increase from the mean of the World War I mortality variable and the mean of 
the age 20 to 49 influenza mortality variable.  Age 20 to 49 mortalities from the influenza 
pandemic and World War I mortalities resulted in a 1.21 and a 0.92 percentage point 
increase in real manufacturing wage growth, respectively.  The aggregate effect of age 20 
to 49 influenza mortalities and World War I mortalities reveals a 1.41 percentage point 
increase in real manufacturing wage growth.   
[Table 6 about here] 
 
City Influenza Mortalities and Wage Growth 
  An analysis similar to that done at the state level is now conducted using 
influenza mortality data for U.S. cities, but the analysis is absent any information about 
World War I mortalities since combat deaths by city are not available.  All city labor 
market variables were obtained from the 1914 and 1919 U.S. Census of Manufacturers 
and are identical to those used in the state-level analysis.  Mortality data are obtained 
  18from a U.S. Public Health Service (1930) report on influenza mortality rates in 50 cities 
in the United States.  The Public Health Service report provides monthly data on excess 
mortalities from the influenza on an annual basis.
34  For the purposes here, monthly city 
mortality rates were summed over the period March 1918 to April 1919 and then divided 
by twelve to get a city influenza death rate (per 100,000 population) during the pandemic.  
Excess influenza mortality rates by city during the pandemic are shown in Table 7. 
[Table 7 about here] 
The percentage change in city manufacturing wages per worker over the period 
1914-1919 is regressed on excess influenza mortalities per capita (as described earlier), 
value added per worker in 1914, capital per worker in 1914, the wartime production 
dummy variable, and the growth in manufacturing sector variable.  State dummy 
variables are included to capture any unobserved heterogeneity.   Regression results are 
shown in Table 8. 
[Table 8 about here] 
  The city-level regression results are somewhat different than the state-level results 
presented earlier.  Although the coefficients on capital per worker and value added per 
worker (both highly correlated) retain their negative signs, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant.  War production remains positive and significant, and the effect 
on wages is higher than in the state-level regressions – manufacturing wage growth was 
about 23 percentage points higher in war production cities (based on specifications 3 and 
4).  Also, the coefficient on the growth in manufacturing variable is positive and 
significant.  The lower adjusted R
2 and a fewer number of significant coefficients 
                                                 
34 ‘Excess’ deaths refers to those deaths above (or below) some historical median rate.  The monthly rates 
were converted to an annual number by multiplying by 12.  See U.S. Public Health Service (1930), Table 
A, page 27 for a specific discussion on how the rates were calculated. 
  19compared to the state-level models suggests there is much more (unexplained) variation 
in wage growth across U.S. cities than across states.  
Focusing on influenza mortalities, the regression results reveal that those cities 
having had higher excess influenza death rates experienced greater growth in 
manufacturing wages over the period 1914 to 1919.   For each city used in the analysis 
(Table 7), the percentage point increase in wages resulting from a ten percent increase in 
the influenza mortality rate was calculated using the coefficient on influenza mortalities 
from the third specification of Table 8.  These estimates are shown in Table 9 along with 
the actual increase in city manufacturing wages from 1914 to 1919.  Comparing the two 
numbers for each city reveals the impact of influenza mortalities on wage growth relative 
to total city wage growth.  On average, a ten percent increase in city-level mortality rates 
resulted in a 3.1 percentage point increase in city manufacturing wages.   This estimate is 
about 1.0 to 1.5 percentage points higher than that found from the state-level regressions.  
Most manufacturing activity was located in urban areas and influenza mortality rates 
were higher in urban areas as well, so it seems reasonable that influenza mortalities in the 
city would have a greater impact on city manufacturing wages compared to more rural 
areas (which are included in the state-level analysis).   
[Table 9 about here] 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The concurrence of the 1918 influenza pandemic and World War I resulted in a 
significant number of mortalities over a brief period in history.  Mortalities from both 
events were disproportionately higher for males of prime working age, thus making it 
  20likely that the manufacturing labor market was influenced by mortalities from the 
influenza pandemic and World War I.  The hypothesis of this paper was that mortalities 
from both events constituted a significant decrease in the supply of manufacturing labor 
which initially increased both the marginal product of labor and capital per worker, and 
thus resulted in an immediate increase in wage rates.  The empirical results obtained from 
a sample of U.S. states and cities support the theoretical predictions.  Specifically, states 
and cities that had more influenza mortalities and states having had more World War I 
combat mortalities experienced greater growth in manufacturing wages over the period 
1914 to 1919.  The total effect of influenza mortalities on wage growth was greater than 
that from World War I combat mortalities.     
Certainly the 1918 influenza pandemic had serious negative effects on state and 
national economies.  While specific estimates are prohibited by the lack of detailed 
economic data of the era, the deaths of primary breadwinners left many families without 
sources of income, commerce was hindered, and a general fear by the public seriously 
hampered economic activity (Crosby, 1989).  The findings here suggest that one benefit 
of the influenza pandemic was an immediate increase in wages, at least in the 
manufacturing sector, for those surviving the pandemic.  Of course, no reasonable 
argument can be made that this benefit outweighed the costs from the tremendous loss of 
life and overall economic activity.  Nonetheless, the results obtained here suggest that 
some labor markets today, especially those for hourly, lower-skilled employment without 
contracts, may provide workers with higher wages during and in the immediate aftermath 
of a modern day pandemic. 
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Table 1 – Influenza and WWI Combat Mortality Rankings, By State 
 
Influenza Mortalities Per 100,000 Population 
World War I Combat 
Mortalities Per 100,000 
Population 
       
Top 5 States  1916-1917  Top 5 States  1918-1919  Top 5 States 
Connecticut 455.5  Pennsylvania  1,119.6  Montana  161.1 
Pennsylvania 413.3  Maryland  1,042  Wyoming  92.6 
Vermont 410.2  Colorado 1,020  North  Dakota  84.8 
Maryland 407.7  New  Jersey  995.9  Connecticut  83.1 
Rhode Island  407.7  Connecticut 992.2  Idaho  77.1 
       
Bottom 5 States  1916-1917  Bottom 5 States  1918-1919  Bottom 5 States 
Utah 252.2  Washington  599.4  Georgia  26.5 
North Carolina  251.7  Wisconsin  584.1  Delaware  23.1 
California 228.4 Michigan 581.5  Louisiana  22.3 
Minnesota 209.8  Minnesota 557.4 Mississippi 18.7 
Washington 157.7  Oregon  523.6  Florida  18.7 
       
Average of 
other States  318.2  Average of 
other States  802.7  Average of other 
States  50.9 
Note:  Influenza mortalities include death from pneumonia.  See text for explanation.  Data are from U.S 
Bureau of the Census, Mortality Statistics 1920, page 30.  Twenty-six states reported influenza and flu death 
rates in 1916 and 1917 and thirty states reported influenza and pneumonia mortality rates in 1918 and 1919.  
Influenza pandemic and World War I mortalities shown above are normalized by 1914 state population.   
See text for a further description of this variable.  Combat mortality data are from the Adjutant General of 
the Army, Summary of Casualties Among Members of the American Expeditionary Forces during The 
World War.  Mortality rates are computed using 1914 state population.  Combat mortalities refer to all 
deaths in combat from any cause other than disease.  Summary of Casualties also reports mortalities by 
disease.  See text for a further description of this variable. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Percentage change in real 
manufacturing wages per 
worker 1914-1919 
11.49 12.64 -15.85 38.05 
1918-1919 Influenza 
mortalities per 100,000 
population 
829.28 171.64 544.41  1,154.14 
World War I combat 
mortalities per 100,000 
population 
56.10 23.81 22.30  161.06 
Influenza and WWI 
mortalities per 100,000 
population 
885.38 181.88 592.10  1,294.02 
Capital per manufacturing 
worker 1914  $3,507  $1,109.40 $1,854.97 $6,663.48 
Value added per 
manufacturing worker 1914  $1,427.43 $414.40  $666.66 $2,751.18 
Wartime production  0.1333  0.3457  0  1 
Growth in manufacturing 
sector 1914-1919 (percent 
change in workers) 
32.64 24.96  2.41 103.10 
Number of Observations = 30.  All data for U.S. States.  See text for data sources and descriptions. 
 
  26Table 3: Influenza and WWI Mortalities on Manufacturing Wage Growth 1914-1919 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















WWI Mortalities Per Capita  183.67*** 
(3.21) 
183.41*** 
(3.45)  ------- -------  120.54** 
(2.25) 
141.01** 
(2.56)  ------- ------- 







(1.75)  ------- ------- 
WWI and Influenza Mortalities 




Capital Per Worker – 1914
a 0.003 
(0.02)  -------  -0.036 
(1.54)  -------  -0.019 
(0.85)  -------  -0.032 
(1.47)  ------- 


































































































2 0.696 0.709 0.705 0.698 0.719 0.727 0.717 0.712 
a Coefficients multiplied by 1,000. 
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10 percent.  T-statistics are in parentheses and are based on White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors.  The 
dependent variable is the percentage change in state-level real manufacturing wages from 1914 to 1919.  Number of observations = 30. See text for a complete description of each 
variable. 
  27Table 4 – Estimated Impact of Variables on Manufacturing Wage Growth 1914-1919 
 
  
Impact of Change on Wage Growth 
(Percentage Point Increase/Decrease) 
From Select Specifications in Table 3 
Variable  Change  (2) (4) (6) (8) 
WWI Mortalities Per Capita  Mean + 10 percent  1.03  -------  0.79  ------- 
Influenza Mortalities Per Capita  Mean + 10 percent  -------  2.26 1.59  ------- 
WWI and Influenza Mortalities 
Per Capita  Mean + 10 percent  -------  -------  -------  2.49 
Value Added Per Worker – 1914  Mean + 10 percent  -3.41 -2.38 -3.24 -2.56 
War Production Dummy  0 to 1  11.4 10.00 9.90  9.70 
Growth in Manufacturing Sector  Mean + 10 percent  0.51 0.77 0.74 0.80 
Northeast Dummy  0 to 1  3.00  8.80  5.30  8.30 
South Dummy  0 to 1  19.30 23.90 22.60 24.10 
Midwest Dummy  0 to 1  6.20 13.40  11.60  13.70 
Note:  Coefficient estimates and mean values from specifications (2), (4), (6) and (8) in Table 3 are used to 
estimate percentage point increases/decreases.  Bold-face values reflect impacts based on statistically 
significant coefficient estimates in Table 3. 
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Table 5: Influenza Mortalities Aged 20 to 49 and Wage Growth 1914-1919 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3) 






WWI Mortalities Per Capita  -------  163.73** 
(2.30)  ------- 
Influenza Mortalities Aged 20 to 49 Per Capita  31.384* 
(1.87) 
8.910 
(0.44)  ------- 
WWI and Influenza Mortalities Per Capita  -------  -------  31.926** 
(2.28) 













































2 0.654 0.683 0.669 
a Coefficients multiplied by 1,000. 
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10 percent.  T-statistics are in parentheses and are based on 
White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors.  The dependent variable is the percentage change in state-level 
real manufacturing wages from 1914 to 1919.  Number of observations = 30.  See text for a complete description of 
each variable. 
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Table 6: Effect of Mortalities on Wage Growth 
Impact of a Mean + 10 percent change on wage growth 
  Percentage Point Increase 
from Table 6 specifications 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3) 
WWI Mortalities Per Capita  -------  0.92  ------- 
Influenza Mortalities Aged 20 to 
49 Per Capita  1.21  0.34  ------- 
WWI and Influenza Mortalities 
Per Capita  ------- -------  1.41 
      
Note:  Coefficient estimates from specifications (1), (2), and (3) in 
Table 5 are used to estimate change.  Bold-face values reflect impacts 
based on statistically significant coefficient estimates in Table 5. 
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Table 7 –  (Excess) Influenza Pandemic Mortality Rates (per 100,000) 
For 50 U.S. Cities 
 
Albany 583.3  Minneapolis  336.8 
Atlanta 368.6  Nashville  781.9 
Baltimore 616.0  New  Haven  567.2 
Birmingham 712.8  New  Orleans  678.3 
Boston 680.9  New  York  466.6 
Bridgeport 748.0  Newark  582.8 
Buffalo 539.2  Oakland  531.5 
Cambridge 503.1  Omaha  567.9 
Chicago 361.4  Paterson  609.7 
Cincinnati 552.6  Philadelphia  792.7 
Cleveland 583.3  Pittsburgh  1104.7 
Columbus 365.3  Portland  538.9 
Dayton 429.3  Providence  625.0 
Denver 688.6  Richmond  532.7 
Detroit 354.3  Rochester  406.3 
Fall River  641.1  San Francisco  656.9 
Grand Rapids  226.1  Scranton  792.5 
Indianapolis 419.9 Seattle  433.8 
Jersey City  698.7  Spokane  494.1 
Kansas City, MO  694.8  St Louis  415.5 
Los Angeles  496.8  St. Paul  409.1 
Louisville 637.3  Syracuse  485.0 
Lowell 555.4  Toledo  354.6 
Memphis 580.8  Washington,  DC 579.2 
Milwaukee 396.4  Worcester  617.7 
U.S. Public Health Service (1930) provides monthly excess mortality statistics on an annual basis.  To 
compute the data shown in the table, the monthly excess mortalities from U.S. Public Health Service 
(1930) from March 1918 to April 1919 were summed and then divided by twelve.  ‘Excess’ deaths 
refers to those deaths above (or below) some historical median rate.  See U.S. Public Health Service 
(1930), Table A, page 27 for more information.
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Table 8 – City Influenza Mortalities and Wage Growth, 1914-1919 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
















Capital Per Worker – 1914
a ------- ------- ------- -0.004 
(0.13) 
Value Added Per Worker – 1914
a -0.279*** 












Growth in Manufacturing Sector  0.095* 




State Dummy Variables  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2 0.273 0.209 0.425 0.395 
a Coefficients multiplied by 1,000. 
Notes:  *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10 percent.  T-statistics are in parentheses and are based on 
White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors.  The dependent variable is the percentage change in real city 
manufacturing wages from 1914 to 1919.  Number of observations = 50.  The mean value of influenza mortalities is 
0.00556 (556 per 100,000).  See text for a complete description of each variable. 
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in Wages from 









in Wages from 
10% increase in 
flu deaths 
Albany 61.2  3.29  Minneapolis  62.0  1.90 
Atlanta 93.3  2.08  Nashville  74.1  4.41 
Baltimore 119.0  3.47 New  Haven 76.0  3.20 
Birmingham 92.4  4.02 New  Orleans 86.7  3.83 
Boston 73.3 3.84  New  York  106.5 2.63 
Bridgeport 114.5  4.22  Newark  107.1  3.29 
Buffalo 97.1  3.04 Oakland 74.7  3.00 
Cambridge 66.1  2.84  Omaha  96.3  3.20 
Chicago 84.5  2.04 Paterson 98.0  3.44 
Cincinnati 77.9  3.12  Philadelphia  111.3  4.47 
Cleveland 105.4  3.29  Pittsburgh 103.8  6.23 
Columbus 78.6  2.06  Portland  90.8  3.04 
Dayton 117.9  2.42  Providence  79.8  3.53 
Denver 62.0  3.88  Richmond  86.7  3.00 
Detroit 110.8 2.00 Rochester  80.0  2.29 
Fall River  88.2  3.62  San Francisco  54.4  3.71 
Grand Rapids  88.1  1.28  Scranton  72.2  4.47 
Indianapolis 70.6  2.37  Seattle  94.2  2.45 
Jersey City  102.5  3.94  Spokane  39.7  2.79 
Kansas City, MO  65.9  3.92  St Louis  67.3  2.34 
Los Angeles  51.9  2.80  St. Paul  64.4  2.31 
Louisville 76.5  3.60  Syracuse  80.0  2.74 
Lowell 111.8 3.13  Toledo  89.4  2.00 
Memphis 50.0  3.28  Washington,  DC 84.0  3.27 
Milwaukee 82.0  2.24  Worcester  91.9  3.48 
Note:  The percentage point increase in computed by increasing influenza death rates (Table 7) by 10 percent 
and multiplying by the coefficient on influenza deaths in Table 8, specification 3 (56.407). 
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